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Dennis and Joan Dana acquired a 3.75 acre tract of
land as a gift from Dennis Dana's parents.' Dana's parents
retained a tract of land that bordered both the 3.75 acres
that they had given away and the Muddy String Road, a
public road.2 For Dennis and Joan to obtain access to the
Muddy String Road, they would need a road approximately
one and one-half miles long across the land of their grantors,
Dennis' parents.'
Instead of proceeding to enforce a common law way of
necessity4 against their grantors, however, the Danas initiated a statutory proceeding' for the establishment of a
private road across the adjacent land of Alfred and Carol
Jean Walton.6 To obtain access to U.S. Highway 89 the Danas,
pursuant to the statute, petitioned the Board of County
Commissioners of Lincoln County for a road approximately
one-quarter mile long through the Waltons' land. This road
that the Danas sought to establish was already in existence
and had been used by their predecessors in possession.' The
commissioners denied the petition. On appeal the district court
reversed "and directed that a road be established for the
Danas across the land of the Waltons." The Wyoming
Supreme Court affirmed the district court. The court found
that the Danas met their burden of proof of showing necessity
as required by Section 24-9-101 of the Wyoming Statutes."
They held, contrary to the Waltons' argument, 0 "that the
availability of a common law way of necessity is not a factor
to be considered" in a proceeding to establish a private road. 1
Walton v. Dana is the most recent Wyoming Supreme
Court case interpreting Section 24-9-101. With the rapid
Copyright@ 1981 by the University of Wyoming

1.

Walton v. Dana, 609 P.2d 461, 462 (Wyo. 1980).

2. Brief for Appellees at 3, Walton v. Dana, 609 P.2d 461 (Wyo. 1980).
3. Walton v. Dana, supra note 1, at 462.
4. A discussion of the common-law way of necessity is found in Snell v.
Ruppert, 541 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Wyo. 1975).
5. WYO. STAT. § 24-9-101 (1977).

6.
7.
8.
9.

Walton v. Dana, supra note 1, at 462.
Id.
Id.
WYO. STAT. § 24-9-101 (1977) [hereinafter cited in text and notes as Section
24-9-101], cited in Walton v. Dana, supra note 1, at 464.
10. Brief for Appellants at 4, Walton v. Dana, 609 P.2d 461 (Wyo. 1980).
11. Walton v. Dana, supra note 1, at 464.
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growth in population taking place in Wyoming, 2 the use of
this procedure for establishing a private road will probably
increase as real estate transactions and development increase.
The purpose of this case note is to examine Section 24-9-101
as it has been interpreted in Walton v. Dana and three earlier
Wyoming Supreme Court decisions. Particular attention is
given to the standard of "necessity" that the law requires
a petitioner to show before he is entitled to a private road
across the land of someone who was not the petitioner's
grantor. Generally, the court has treated applicants under
the statute favorably by employing a standard of necessity
that is easily met. Because of the favorable treatment
accorded those seeking a statutory right-of-way, the possible
adverse effects on adjacent landowners-the ones whose land
is subject to this private eminent domain proceedingwarrant discussion.'"
WYOMING'S PRIVATE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDING FOR
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PRIVATE ROADS-SECTION
24-9-101 OF THE WYOMING STATUTES

In a recent opinion the Wyoming Supreme Court stated4
that Section 24-9-101 "is quite simple and must be followed."
The statute provides in part that
[a] ny person whose land shall be so situated that it
has no outlet to, nor connection with a public road,
may make application in writing to the board of
county commissioners of his county at a regular
session, for a private road leading from his premises to some convenient public road. 15
The statute further requires that the applicant notify
interested parties including the owner, resident agent, or
occupant of the lands that may be subject to the private
road. The court has read another important procedural
requirement into the statute; it has held that "applicants
12. For statistics documenting and projecting Wyoming's growth in population
see WYOMING

POPULATION AND EMPLOYMENT

FORECAST REPORT, 7

(June

1979).
13. The Wyoming Supreme Court characterizes what is now Section 24-9-101
as a private "eminent domain proceeding" in Snell v. Ruppert, 541 P.2d
1042, 1046 (Wyo. 1975).
14. McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1286 (Wyo. 1980).
15. WYO. STAT. § 24-9-101 (1977).
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must initially propose a road by some adequate description."'' 6
The only restriction on the choice of routes is that "it must
be simply a reasonable and convenient route."'"
Upon hearing the application, the county commissioners
determine whether the petitioner has complied with the
procedural requirements and whether the road is necessary.
If the commissioners find that these two requirements have
been met, they appoint viewers and appraisers to locate and
mark out a private road and to assess the damage sustained
by the landowner.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STANDARD OF NECESSITY
APPLIED IN A PROCEEDING TO ESTABLISH A

PRIVATE ROAD
Although Section 24-9-101 is essentially older than
statehood, few early cases interpret or apply the statute."
In McIlquham v. Anthony Wilkinson Live Stock Co., decided
in 1909, the Wyoming Supreme Court first considered the
question of what degree of necessity "will entitle a party
to a way of necessity over the lands of another."' 9 The court
in McIlquham defined "necessity" negatively by stating that
"where a party has one way by which he can reach a public
highway, and which affords him reasonable facilities for
possessing, using and enjoying his own premises, he is not
entitled to another way as a way of necessity." 0 The facts
in Mcliquham did not demand that the court address the
hard question now receiving so much attention: whether a
party wanting access to a landlocked parcel must bring an
action against his grantor for an implied easement or way
of necessity before he is entitled to a statutory right-of-way
across the lands of others. In finding that necessity is present
only if a landowner does not have a way by which he can
reach a public highway, the court had not provided clear
guidelines for later decisions on the issue of necessity. But
recently the court has commented that in McIlquham "this
16.
17.
18.
19.

McGuire v. McGuire, 8upra note 14.
Id.
Id. at 1288.
McIlquham v. Anthony Wilkinson Live Stock Co., 18 Wyo. 53, 104 P. 20,

22 (1909) [hereinafter cited in text as Mcllquham].

20. Id.
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court implicitly found that the statute was an alternative
remedy and it was not intended to supplant the common-law
right of a grantee to a means of access to his land over the
lands of his grantor."'" This recent, 1980, reading of MeIlquham clearly demonstrates that, regardless of the court's
interpretation of Section 24-9-101, this law does not abolish
the common-law action for a way of necessity.
Not until the case of Snell v. Ruppert in 1975 did the
court address in detail the problem of the statutory rightof-way. 2 The factual situation in Snell was similar to the
one in Walton v. Dana five years later. The petitioner in
Snell purchased a two and one-half acre lot in a subdivision. "
This lot had no access to a public road because a creek and
other lots in the subdivision intervened. The petitioner
attempted to purchase a road easement from the respondent.
When the respondent refused, petitioner Ruppert initiated
a proceeding for a private road as provided in Section 24-92
of the Wyoming Statutes.24 The county commissioners ordered
the establishment of a private road; the district court and
the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed."
In protesting the establishment of a private road across
their land, the respondents argued that there was no need
for Ruppert to take their land because he had a common
law way of necessity across the intervening lots in the
subdivision." Thus in Snell the court confronted one of the
major issues later presented in Walton v. Dana: whether
the landlocked owner is
confined to the common-law remedy of forcing a
way of necessity across the lots.., having a common
origin of unity of title with his or whether he has
road
available to him the right to take a private
7
2
title.
his
to
across the lands of a stranger
21. McGuire v. McGuire, supra note 14, at 1288.
22. Snell v. Ruppert, 541 P.2d 1042 (Wyo. 1975) [hereinafter cited in text and
notes as Snell].
23. Id. at 1044.
24. WYO. STAT. § 24-92 (1957); this statute was the predecessor to Section
24-9-101 and was essentially the same as the later statute.
25. Snell v. Ruppert, supra note 22, at 1045, 1049.
26. Id. at 1045.
27. Id.
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The Wyoming Supreme Court concluded that it was not a
condition precedent to proceeding under the statute that
Ruppert bring an earlier action to enforce a common-law
way of necessity. 8 They reached this conclusion by interpreting the statute literally. The statute imposes "no such
condition" of first pursuing a common-law remedy, and the
justices could not "stretch, extend, enlarge nor amend what
the legislature has clearly said. ' 29 The holding in Snell
clearly indicated that the test of statutory necessity for a
private road would not be rigorous.
Although the decision was grounded on a literal reading
of the statute, the facts in Snell also supported the landlocked
party's position. The court noted that while it was not necessary to their holding, "there may be a practical reason why
a civil action would not lie" and why a statutory remedy
was appropriate.3 Because more than 50 years had passed
since the creation of the subdivision, "the intervening lot
owners could probably successfully raise the shield of the
10-year statute of limitations."3 They also noted that the
"best way" to gain access was over the respondent's land,
not over the other lots sharing unity of title with the landlocked tract.2 The statutory right-of-way was the "best way"
because it was the least expensive way, and it preserved land
values. To proceed across the other lots in the subdivision
would necessitate cutting down trees and would disrupt
improvements. Unsatisfactory terrain was also mentioned.
So the court's holding, although expressly resting on what
they found to be the clear meaning of the statute, was strongly
supported by factors of convenience and economy.
No specific standard of necessity was stated in Snell.
The court made clear, however, that a petitioner would not
have to seek first a common-law way of necessity. They also
suggested the importance of convenience factors in determining the necessity for a particular right-of-way.
Id. at 1046.
Id.
Id.
Id. The court refers here to WYO. STAT. § 1-13 (1957); this statute now
appears in identical form as Wyo. STAT. § 1-3-103 (1977).
32. Snell v. Ruppert, supra note 22, at 1044.
33. Id.
28.
29.
30.
31.
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In the 1980 case of McGuire v. McGuire,4 decided five
years after Snell, the Wyoming Supreme Court articulated
for the first time a test for necessity under Section 24-9-101.
Simply applying the statutory language, the court held that
"any person whose land is so situated that it has no outletno legally enforceable means by which he can gain accesshas demonstrated necessity, as a matter of law." 5 At first
glance this test appears to reopen a question apparently
settled in Snell: whether a petitioner for a private road first
has to pursue any possible common-law remedy. A respondent might argue that since a common-law way of necessity
was a "legally enforceable means" of gaining access, the
proposed road was not necessary. The court removed this
ambiguity less than a month later. In Walton v. Dana the
court stated that the word "necessary" in the statute means
there is no legally enforceable, "existing" outlet to a public
road." Thus, in line with Snell, McGuire does not require
the petitioner to first seek a common-law way of necessity
in order to show necessity for a private road.
After McGuire the isolated landowner, as long as he
has not already obtained a common-law way of necessity or
some other right of way, apparently satisfies the necessity
requirement of Section 24-9-101 automatically. The court
in McGuire clarifies just how low the necessity hurdle is.
After a petitioner demonstrates that he has no legally
enforceable, existing outlet from his land, the following
considerations are irrelevant to a determination of statutory
necessity: whether or not the petitioner lives on the land;
whether or not the land is, or will be, used for some specific
purpose; what the impact of the road will be on adjacent
landowners; what financial interest the petitioner has in
acquiring a private road; and whether or not petitioner had
been denied permissive access." Once an applicant has met
the mere formality of showing necessity and has complied
with procedural requirements, he is technically entitled to
a statutory right-of-way.
34.
35.
36.
37.

McGuire v. McGuire, supra note 14 [hereinafter cited in text as McGuire].
Id.
Walton v. Dana, supra note 1, at 463 n. 1.
McGuire v. McGuire, supra note 14.
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APPLYING THE NECESSITY STANDARD AND
ITS LIMITS
RECOGNIZING (SUGGESTING?)

Walton v. Dana is the first Wyoming Supreme Court
case to apply the standard of necessity set forth, but not
actually applied, in McGuire. In holding that the Danas were
entitled to a private road across the Waltons' land, the Court
employed this simple statutory test as follows:
The evidence is undisputed that the Danas have
no presently existing "outlet to, nor connection with
a public road." In McGuire, we held such facts to
establish necessity as a matter of law. 8
As in the Snell case five years earlier, however, factors of
convenience and economy were used both to bolster a finding
that the private road was necessary and to suggest the inappropriateness of requiring petitioner Dana to first pursue
a common-law way of necessity. In Snell the factors considered were trees, improvements, and unsatisfactory terrain;
in Walton v. Dana the convenience factors mentioned were
swamps, a canal, and disproportionate distance. The distance
across the grantors' land was one and one-half miles as
compared to a distance across the Waltons' land, using a
pre-existing road at that, of only one-quarter mile.3
By recognizing economic and convenience considerations
the court appears to be emphasizing that the petitioner's
right to a private road, even after he has shown necessity,
is limited to a right to a convenient public road. Just because
the isolated landowner has met the necessity test of having
no legally enforceable, existing outlet to a public road,
Section 24-9-101 does not give him total freedom in choosing
the locations of the private road. Although "the applicants
must initially propose a road by some adequate description,"
the viewers appointed by the county commissioners have the
"ultimate power to locate the road.""
As suggested by the opinions in Snell and Walton v.
Dana, the Wyoming Supreme Court appears willing to
38. Walton v. Dana, supra note 1, at 463-464.
39. Id. at 464.
40. McGuire v. McGuire, supra note 14.
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review the initial determination of convenience. The court
has not reviewed the convenience element in absolute terms.
Despite their statement that the route chosen by the applicant "must be simply a reasonable and convenient route"
and need not "be the most convenient and reasonable route,"
the court establishes convenience relative to possible routes
across the land of the grantor or the successor in interest to
the grantor.4 As stated in Walton v. Dana, the facts spoke
"for themselves in the matter of convenience," so there was
no need for the court to examine closely the element of
convenience." In certain situations likely to arise, particularly situations involving large tracts of land in developing
areas, the court will be, or should be, forced to look more
carefully at the relative convenience of various routes.
LITIGATING A CLAIM FOR A STATUTORY
RIGHT-OF-WAY IN WYOMING

The Petitioner's Obstacle
Because the necessity requirement under Section 24-9101 has become largely a formality, the more severe test
of the petitioner's claim for a private road will probably
occur over the issue of convenience.
The court's statement that Section 24-9-101 "offers
complete relief to the landowner who has no outlet from his
land" may be misleading.43 The fact that the court considers
economy and convenience factors suggests that it is willing
to engage in a balancing process aimed at securing a
relatively convenient right-of-way. In stating that a petitioner need not "overcome every obstacle . . . regardless of
the expense and practicality if he has a common law way
of necessity he can claim," the court implies that in some
cases a petitioner may have to overcome some obstacles and
claim a right-of-way across his grantor's land, not the land
of a stranger to his title. Important in this context is the
availability of the remedy of the common-law way of neces41. Id.
42. Walton v. Dana, supra note 1, at 464.
43. Id.
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sity.'" Although the court has said that this remedy is
enforceable at the option of the isolated landowner, it is
unlikely, given the court's concern for economy and convenience, that an applicant would be granted a statutory
right-of-way when a significantly more convenient rightof-way is possible across the land of his grantor.
In both Snell and Walton v. Dana, the two cases where
the court reached the merits of a Section 24-9-101 claim,
this problem of relative convenience did not arise. In these
cases the most convenient access to the landlocked tract was
obviously not across the remaining land of the grantor or
his successor in interest. But where there is a real question
as to which parcel of land provides a more convenient rightof-way, the court may not permit a statutory right-of-way
across the land of a stranger to the applicant's title. What
determines convenience in a particular setting is a relative
matter. A potential right-of-way is only convenient and
reasonable to the extent that it is preferable to other locations. Thus the availability of a common-law way of necessity
could, as a practical matter, be a factor in future determinations of a party's right to a private road under Section
24-9-101. A petitioner is well advised to prepare a strong
case for the convenience of the route he has chosen.
The Respondent's Case
Viewed from the perspective of a landowner who may
lose his land in a statutory right-of-way proceeding, the
recent decisions do not look encouraging. The argument that
the applicant has a common-law way of necessity will not
negate statutory necessity. Thus the party opposing the
right-of-way, the respondent, must concentrate on the convenience element. If he can show that a right-of-way across
the grantor's land would be more convenient or economical,
he should have a strong case. But even if the respondent is
not able to argue convenience persuasively in his favor, he
may still have other arguments.
44. In Leo Sheep Co. v. United.States, 440 U.S. 668, 680 (1979), the United
States Supreme Court misinterprets the holding in Snell as to the continued
recognition of the common law way of necessity in-Wyoming.
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One possible point of attack for the respondent is the
requirement of good faith that the court has read into
Section 24-9-101." In Walton v. Danathe respondents offered
this argument both on a policy level and on the facts of the
case. They pointed to the possibility of "collusive abuse" of
the statute by the applicant and his grantor."' If the commonlaw way of necessity is ignored, the Waltons argued, "parties
could convey away parcels and fabricate the necessity required by statutes such as [Section 24-9-101]." l The respondents argued further that since the grantors and grantees
were closely related, "no more obvious fabrication of necessity
could exist than that found in the instant case."48 Judging
from the holding against the Waltons, the court was not
persuaded by this type of good faith argument. Concern for
convenience and economy apparently outweighed concern for
the possibility of collusion or lack of good faith. In a case
where the convenience factors are not so clearly against the
respondent, however, the court may be more receptive to a
good faith argument.
THE POSSIBLE EXTENT OF ADVERSE EFFECTS
ON ADJACENT LANDOWNERS

The Wyoming Supreme Court has recognized the
important public policy basis underlying eminent domain
proceedings.
There is a public interest in giving access by
individuals to the road and highway network of
the state as a part and an extension thereof for
economic reasons and the development of land as
a resource for the common good, whether residential
or otherwise.49
The court's apparent desire to facilitate such policies in
a convenient and economical manner is laudable. The property rights of a fully compensated landowner may indeed
45.

McGuire v. McGuire, supra note 14, at 1286 n. 10.

46. Brief for Appellants, supra note 10, at 15.
47. Id.
48. Id.
.49.. Snell v. Ruppert, supra note 22, at 1046 n. 5. Similar policy reasons are
behind the common-law way of necessity. See, Glenn, Implied Easements
in the North Carolina Courts: An Essay on the Meaning of Necessity, 58
N.C. L. REV. 223, 227-228 (1980)..
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be less important than the larger societal interest in natural
resource conservation and development. But even if one
accepts the practicality and progressiveness of the court's
view of Section 24-9-101, cause for concern still exists.
As discussed in the previous section of this note, the
court has not foreclosed the possibility of successful litigation
for either party. But at this early stage in the application
of Section 24-9-101, the case for the petitioner appears more
favorable. In the few cases decided by the court, a good
faith request for a reasonable and convenient route was all
that the court has expressly required of a landlocked property owner who had no legally enforceable, existing outlet
to a public road. The only possible case for respondents
appears to lie in convenience and good faith arguments,
arguments that have not helped respondents thus far. In
their concern for executing the letter of the statutory rightof-way and the policy behind it, the court may have lost
sight of a potentially serious threat to owners of land that
is taken for a private road. This threat arises from the
failure of the statute to place any specific limitation on the
use of the private road other than a maximum width of
thirty feet.5" Section 24-9-101 also makes no provision for
additional compensation in the event of alteration of use or
increased use.
Apparently no Wyoming case law exists concerning
specific question of the use of a private road establishedthis
by
a statutory proceeding. It is probably a safe assumption,
however, that common-law easement principles would govern
the use of rights-of-way created under Section 24-9-101.
Thus a person whose land is made, in effect, a servient
tenement by operation of Section 24-9-101 would probably
have to look to common law for protection against significant changes in the use of the "easement" created by statute.
Of course there may be a legal question as to whether the
private road is an easement at all and therefore subject to
common-law restrictions on use of easements.
50. Wyo. STAT. § 24-9-101 (1977).
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What protection the common law affords the respondent
may be inappropriate in some cases. In Bard Ranch Co. v.
Weber5 the Wyoming Supreme Court discusses common-law
restrictions on theuse of easements. The owner of a servient
tenement appears to be protected by the principle "that the
owner of the easement cannot materially increase the burden
of the servient estate or impose thereon a new and additional
burden."5 2 This principle does not, however, freeze the use
of the easement. Citing an Oregon case,53 the court noted
the rule that "in the absence of a contrary intent both the
uses of the dominant and servient owners are subject to
adjustment consistent with the normal development of their
respective lands."" ' Perhaps the most serious potential danger
to the servient owner deriving from this second principle
is the increased use resulting from subdivision of a large
tract. The general rule is that "where there is an easement
of way appurtenant to a tenement,.., the subsequent owner
of a part of such tenement has the right to use the way as
appurtenant to his particular part of the land."5 When a
common-law way of necessity is available to the isolated
landowner, a court should not impose on adjacent landowners, other than the grantor, the risk of an easement, or
private road, that could undergo greatly increased use.
In the cases that have come before the court thus far,
this factor of the possibility of heavy use of the easement
has not arisen. The landlocked acreages involved in these
cases have been relatively small. But in a developing area
where a large tract is involved, the unexpected harm to an
adjacent landowner could be devastating. If subdivision is
occurring in the area and could be considered a normal use
of the landlocked tract, the statutory right-of-way may be
subjected to greatly increased use. The subsequent development may enhance the monetary value of the respondent's
land, but this may be of little consolation for someone whose
land was acquired with the expectation of enjoying solitude,
,51. Bard Ranch Company v. Weber, 557 P.2d 722 (Wyo. 1976).
52. Id. at 731.
53. Jones v. Edwards, 219 Or. 429, 347 P.2d 846, 848 (1959).
_54..Bard Ranch .Company.v. Weber,..e pr%note 51,. at 731.
.
. -.
55. Annot., 34 A.L.R. 972 (1925).
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recreation, or some form of aesthetic benefit. The argument
here is not that the court's policy of encouraging land use
in an economical way is improper. The point is that if
someone need suffer a significant alteration of or increase
in the use of his land, the burden should fall on the person
who made the statutory right-of-way possible in the first
place-the grantor. The burden should not fall on the innocent
adjacent landowner.
CONCLUSION

In Walton v. Dana the Wyoming Supreme Court did
not have to consider the possible adverse effects on the
respondent in order to reach what seems a just and practical
result. Possible future cases, particularly those involving
large tracts of land in developing areas, however, may
demand a closer examination of the adverse effects on the
respondent and the good faith of the petitioner. The approach
outlined by the court in Walton v. Dana and the earlier
decisions is broad enough to enable this more strict examination in appropriate cases.
WARREN R. DARROW
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